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Integrating Management, Research, and Monitoring:
Balancing the 3-Legged Stool
Michael J. Conroy1, James T. Peterson
USGS, Georgia Cooperative Fish and Wildlife Research Unit, Warnell School of Forestry and Natural Resources, University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia,
30602, USA
Research and monitoring programs are often thought of as competing with “on the ground management” for
attention and funding. This is false trichotomy; instead, it is more appropriate to view management, research,
and monitoring as complementary endeavors, in which loss of any 1 of the 3 is disruptive to the remaining 2.
There is often significant or even profound uncertainty about the system’s likely response to management, be-
yond environmental and other sources of uncontrolled variation. Sometimes this uncertainty can be reduced
through directed research studies, including experimentation. However, management decisions usually can-
not await the completion of elaborate, multiple-year studies. Adaptive resource management (ARM) provides
managers a way to make optimal decisions with respect to resource objectives, given the current level of un-
certainty about system response, and in anticipation that learning will improve decision-making through time.
Under ARM, resource goals and objectives are always paramount and research and monitoring programs ex-
ist to provide managers with the tools they need to make better decisions. The essentials of ARM are clear,
compelling, and critically needed in natural resource management. We can no longer afford the luxury, if we
ever could, of management divorced from research and monitoring, and vice versa. By keeping the focus on
management decision-making and resource objective outcomes, ARM places an explicit value on research and
monitoring that then can be used to justify monitoring and research programs.
Citation: Conroy MJ, Peterson JT. 2009. Integrating management, research, and monitoring: balancing the 3-legged stool. Pages 2 - 10 in Ceder-
baum SB, Faircloth BC, Terhune TM, Thompson JJ, Carroll JP, eds. Gamebird 2006: Quail VI and Perdix XII. 31 May - 4 June 2006. Warnell School of
Forestry and Natural Resources, Athens, GA, USA.
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Introduction
In our experience in working with natural re-
source managers and researches, we often encounter
situations where management, research, and mon-
itoring activities are viewed distinctly. Manage-
ment is typically viewed as involving the concrete,
hands-on, practical aspects of conservation: preserv-
ing and managing habitats, regulating harvest and
trade, and other aspects of “on-the-ground” work.
Research, although recognized as important, is of-
ten viewed as less important than monitoring, and
certainly than management-somewhat as a luxury of
academia that we should do, but only if we have suf-
ficient time and funding left. Monitoring is viewed
as a way of assessing the status of populations, com-
munities, and ecosystems, but typically is not for-
mally connected to conservation decisions.
Here we argue that management, research, and
monitoring are actually complementary, not com-
petitive activities, all 3 are important to successful
conservation, and loss of any 1 of the 3 disrupts the
other 2. We use the metaphor of a 3-legged stool to
convey these ideas.
Management As Modeling
Management is simply taking an action to obtain
some desired resource outcome. It requires a range
of alternative actions that can be taken, and specifi-
cation of an objective that we are trying to achieve.
Examples of management include: the application of
prescribed fire to increase or improve habitats and,
presumably, sustain larger populations; the setting
of harvest regulations to provide recreation, con-
trol populations that may be damaging habitats or
otherwise causing problems, and to providing eco-
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nomic benefits; the construction of reserves to main-
tain species diversity, protect endemics, and/or pro-
vide corridors of movement among discrete habitats
or populations.
Research is a process of inquiry that includes de-
scription of natural systems, but also involves ad-
dressing questions about how these systems func-
tion. Thus, research would include testing and
quantifying ecosystem feedback relationships and
mechanisms of population regulation, to name two.
Monitoring involves the observation of natural sys-
tems through space and over time, and may be de-
scriptive (i.e., simply oriented toward quantifying
patterns or trends), but may also be connected di-
rectly to research (by providing answers to testable
predictions) or management (by providing feedback
about the results of management actions).
As we discuss below, we view management, re-
search, and monitoring as highly complementary ac-
tivities, whose boundaries are often blurry. How-
ever, there are unifying ideas, and one of these is the
idea of a model. Conservation managers usually do
not think of themselves as modelers. However, even
if managers are not conscious of the fact, every man-
agement action involves a decision that is made to
reach a goal, and at least implicitly involves a model.
For example, a manager may desire to increase car-
rying capacity via habitat modification such as pre-
scribed fire. Implicitly, he or she believes that certain
actions (e.g., a burn) are likely to have the desired re-
sults (habitat improvement), and these outcomes are
more desirable (have higher objective value; Figure
1a). This belief is a conceptual model of how the sys-
tem is likely to respond to management, whether or
not it is formalized into a mathematical model.
Uncertainty In Management
Sources Of Uncertainty
The reality is that uncertainty nearly always con-
founds a simple decision model (such as Figure 1).
That is, the manager can never be sure with 100%
certainty that any given decision will result in the
desired outcome. Management uncertainty comes
in 4 basic types: environmental uncertainty, partial
controllability, partial observability, and structural
uncertainty; we emphasize the last.
One basic but important form of uncertainty is
that due to the fact that habitat and populations are
influenced by factors that may not be under man-
agement control. For example, if we decide to burn
a woodland to improve habitat conditions, a dis-
ease outbreak or unusually severe winter may oc-
cur that results in a lower than predicted popula-
tion response. Likewise, even if we don’t burn, other
favorable factors may cause the population to per-
form better than predicted. The influence of factors
in the environment that are unpredictable, and that
add to the influence of our management decisions,
is termed environmental uncertainty. A similar result
can occur because the management itself is only par-
tially controllable, for instance, a burn may be cooler
or less extensive than planned, resulting in a poor
response by the population. This is referred to as
partial controllability (Figure 1b).
In addition to these ‘real’ sources of uncertainty,
monitoring programs generally will not be able
to perfectly measure the systems response to our
management. Especially when we are monitoring
abundance and other population or community at-
tributes, these will usually be based on some type of
statistical sample, and thus subject to error. This is
referred to as partial observability, or sometimes, sta-
tistical uncertainty (Figure 1c).
Finally, in addition to all the above sources of
uncertainty, we return to an idea we started with,
namely that management implicitly involves acting
under a model of how our system is likely to re-
spond to management. This model contains, at least
implicitly, current knowledge as to how the system
functions, which is presumably based on past ob-
servation and research. However, this past knowl-
edge basis is seldom unequivocal, and is often very
incomplete. Unless we are absolutely certain about
the basic mechanisms that determine our system, we
should be honest and admit that this model is but
one hypothesis about how the system works, and
that it may not be the best model. In the prescribed
fire example, model 1 is that burning provides a ben-
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Figure 1: Schematic of a hypothetical decision model for effects of prescribed fire on habitat and population
response with (a) no uncertainty in decision-outcome, (b) environmental uncertainty, (c) partial observ-
ability, and (d) structural uncertainty. Here objective values could include the number of hectares of good
habitat and/or population size.
eficial impact, but we should at least consider the
possibility that model 2 (no discernible impact) is
correct. We refer to this last source of uncertainty
as structural uncertainty. Seen in this light, structural
uncertainty is both a research issue-it occurs because
our system understanding is imperfect-and a man-
agement issue-resolving or reducing it leads to bet-
ter decision making.
Dealing With Uncertainty In Decision-making
We begin with the recognition that, although
there are several possible ways of dealing with un-
certainty, ignoring uncertainty can have severe con-
sequences. Failing to deal with uncertainty may lead
to a false sense of security in decision-making and
ultimately compromises our ability to reach our con-
servation objectives. We favor the approach of in-
corporating uncertainty into the objective by means
of expected values. Expected values are simply a
form of weighted averaging, in which objective val-
ues under different possible decision-outcomes are
weighted according to the probability that each out-
come occurs. The decision-maker than selects the
decision that results in the best (e.g., maximum) ob-
jective value on average, which is the expected value.
One important implication of this approach is that
reducing uncertainty– if it can be done– has mea-
surable value in terms of the conservation objec-
tive. In fact, it is possible to calculate how much im-
provement could be made in decision-making, were
it possible to completely eliminate uncertainty; this
is known as the expected value of perfect information
(Lindley 1985, Clemen 1996) in decision-making.
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Reducing Structural Uncertainty
Some types of uncertainty, such as environmen-
tal uncertainty, are essentially impossible to control.
These must be considered in decision-making, but in
all likelihood cannot be reduced (unless we consider
artificially controlling the range of environmental
variation, e.g., via water control devices). Others
can be at least partially reduced by concerted effort:
e.g., better field techniques may reduce (but likely
not eliminate) partial controllability and better sur-
vey methods may reduce partial observability.
We devote special attention to structural uncer-
tainty, because it is the one source of uncertainty
that 1) is very frequently ignored, and 2) can be re-
duced through time via an adaptive approach. Be-
fore discussing adaptive approaches, we mention
the two other major approaches that can be used
to reduce structural uncertainty, because readers are
likely more familiar with these approaches, they
have occurred more frequently in the literature, and
they continue to have merit.
Experiments - which we define as involving con-
trol, randomization, and replication of independent
subjects - are the “gold standard” of scientific in-
quiry. Experiments clearly are ideally capable of re-
ducing uncertainty very quickly, and thus are attrac-
tive. However, realistic experiments at any mean-
ingful spatial scale are difficult or impossible to con-
duct in most conservation systems. In addition, be-
cause experiments are directed at scientific hypothe-
ses, rather than management objectives, they are not
necessarily efficient means of reducing uncertainty
for decision-making.
In contrast to experiments, retrospective studies are
based on an examination of patterns in data that
have been collected in the past; thus they are an-
alyzed “retrospectively.” These often can provide a
good initial basis for the construction of alternative
hypotheses and predictive models used in conserva-
tion. However, potential explanatory relationships
are actually correlative, because of the lack of con-
trols, and are typically confounded with other fac-
tors. As a typical example, Conroy et al. (2002)
retrospectively investigated the potential influence
of habitat, hunting, and competition with mallards
(Anas rubribes) on populations of American black
ducks (Anas rubripes). They detected evidence for
the impacts of all three factors, but could not infer
causation because of confounding (e.g., habitat de-
clined and mallard competition increased over the
same period). Conroy et al. (2002) were able to con-
struct predictive models, but other approaches such
as experimentation (Anderson et al. 1987) or adap-
tive resource management (below) are required to
reduce structural uncertainty for this problem.
Without denying the importance of both exper-
imentation and retrospective analysis, we advocate
a third approach, called adaptive resource man-
agement (ARM; Walters 1986), as being generally
more suited to conservation decision-making. We
especially like the ARM approach because it fits
nicely with the idea of multiple working hypothe-
ses (Chamberlin 1897), which we advocate instead
of null hypothesis testing. ARM can be implemented
in virtually any resource system, and has the advan-
tage of being directed at meeting the conservation
objective, not at meeting a scientific objective per se.
In fact as we will elaborate below, conducted prop-
erly, ARM involves no tradeoff whatever in meet-
ing the resource objective, and thus would appear to
be the optimal means of incorporating information
into decision-making and reducing uncertainty. Be-
low we lay out the principal elements of ARM, pro-
vide some simple examples, and address some com-
mon myths and misunderstandings that have con-
tributed to the (so far) relatively rare use of ARM in
practical conservation.
Elements Of Adaptive Manage-
ment
ARM consists of 3 essential components. The
first is explicit predictions of the effect of manage-
ment actions on resource objectives (e.g., population
size, harvest) under 2 or more models. These pro-
vide the means for comparing the relative support
for different management actions. Here, structural
uncertainty is expressed in the form of alternative
models (e.g., hypotheses) of system dynamics (Fig-
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Figure 2: Schematic of a hypothetical decision model of the effects of prescribed fire decision on popula-
tion response with 2 alternative models. Model 1 predicts an increase in population of 100 in response to
burning, whereas model 2 predicts a decrease of 10. Using the model weights shown, the model averaged
prediction of population response to burning would be an increase of: 100×0.6 + -10×0.4 = 56.
ure 1d). The set of models should be only as large as
is necessary to include the biologically plausible rep-
resentations of system dynamics. During each deci-
sion opportunity, predictions are made under each
alternative model, weighted by the relative support
for the model, and combined across models (Fig-
ure 2). Decisions then are made based on compar-
ing the model-averaged predictions associated with
each management action. Although model weights
change as information is accrued (more below), the
assignment of initial model weights is relatively flex-
ible and can be based on retrospective analyses, ex-
pert judgment, or assigned equally among models.
Sequential decision-making is another require-
ment of ARM and is frequently encountered in nat-
ural resource management. Sequential decision-
making involves tracking a resource (e.g., popula-
tion, habitat condition) through time and making
decisions based, in part, on the observed status of
the resource (Figure 3). The set of management ob-
jectives and actions are usually constant, so that the
same (or similar) decisions are continuously revis-
ited. Sequential decision-making need not take place
on an annual basis and can occur in space as well as
in time (Figure 3). The former is particularly useful
in situations where decisions will not be revisited at
a particular site on a short time horizon but are made
over a number of sites. Information feedback, in this
sense, is used to improve future decisions at sites
that have yet to be managed. Regardless of whether
sequential decision-making is through space or time,
the key is to provide feedback on the effects of man-
agement actions in a timely manner to improve fu-
ture decision-making.
Monitoring is the third required component of
ARM. It provides the information that is used to re-
solve the key uncertainties - chiefly, structural un-
certainty. As described above, structural uncertainty
is expressed quantitatively as model weights or rel-
ative evidences supporting each model, which can
be viewed as probabilities that each respective hy-
pothesis best represents “truth”. To resolve this un-
certainty, we need to determine which model best
approximates the system dynamics and update the
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Figure 3: A graphic representation of a sequential decision-making process, through time or space, with
population as the resource of interest.
weights to reflect our newfound knowledge. Opera-
tionally, this is accomplished by comparing model
predictions to subsequent observations of the sta-
tus of the resource (e.g., population size). Thus at
a minimum, monitoring must include a measure of
the status of the resource that is consistent with pre-
diction (e.g., if population size is predicted, popu-
lation size must be measured). The prediction that
more closely matches the observed status results in
a higher likelihood value and a corresponding in-
crease in the weight for that model. This new weight
then is used to estimate the model-averaged predic-
tions for comparing alternative actions at the next
decision time. Thus, prediction, management, and
monitoring are all connected in a closed loop (Fig-
ure 4). In addition to structural uncertainty, the ad-
ditional sources of uncertainty due to partial observ-
ability, partial controllability, and environmental un-
certainty, must also be accounted for in the decision
model. The general approach is to use probability
modeling to account for these factors, either implic-
itly or explicitly. This is important, both because it
gives a more honest picture of the rates of learning
under ARM, and helps to direct research and moni-
toring priorities to reducing uncertainty, where fea-
sible.
ARM: Myths And Misunderstand-
ing
Although ARM appears to be a useful approach
to managing gamebirds, to our knowledge, ARM
has only been formally applied to waterfowl har-
vest decision-making (Johnson and Williams 1999).
The failure to implement ARM is may be due to
institutional resistance (Samson and Knopf 2001),
but we think it is also attributable to widespread
misconceptions concerning the nature of ARM. Per-
haps the most common misunderstanding is that
ARM is research. ARM is first and foremost man-
agement. The primary objective of ARM is to make
the best decision with respect to management objec-
tives. Learning occurs as a byproduct of manage-
ment rather than experimentation. In fact, experi-
mentation (a.k.a. probing the system) can be subop-
timal because the system can be driven to a state that
is undesirable, potentially reducing future returns
(Williams et al. 2002). For example, experimental
burning may cause the system to revert to a vege-
tational community that does not support gamebird
populations. In ARM, the goal of learning is to re-
duce the uncertainty that has the greatest direct im-
pact on decision-making. Thus, learning is targeted
on those key components that result in improved
decision-making and presumably, greater resource
gains.
Another common ARM myth is that it is too
risky. We contend that natural resource decision-
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Figure 4: Components of adaptive resource management include: prediction under alternative structural
models; feedback of monitoring information to updating weight on alternative models; and adaptive up-
dating through space or time.
making is inherently risky. As we discussed ear-
lier, decision-making is fraught with uncertainty.
Hence, all management actions (or inactions) can
have unintended and unanticipated consequences.
Uncertainty can be reduced by the acquisition of
greater knowledge through study and experimenta-
tion, which can take considerable time and as dis-
cussed above, can force a system into an undesirable
state. Management decisions, however, often can-
not be delayed until sufficient knowledge has been
acquired. Given that decisions under greater uncer-
tainty are riskier than those under less uncertainty,
procedures that reduce uncertainty also reduce risk.
ARM reduces uncertainty through management and
thereby reduces risk. Further, ARM is always di-
rected at achieving the resource goals. Thus, any re-
duction in uncertainty is not at the expense of, but in
addition to, resource gains.
Beliefs that ARM is costly and complicated also
are unfounded. Most agencies currently perform
most of the tasks required for ARM and hence, ARM
would not require additional expenditures. For
example, choosing and implementing management
actions, monitoring, and sometimes modeling ex-
pected outcomes are common practices. All that is
then required is a formal means of integrating these
components. This integration does not need to be
complicated and can be completed with available
user-friendly software, such as Netica (Norsys Soft-
ware Corp., Vancouver, BC, Canada). In fact, the use
of simple (but useful) models is preferable in ARM
(Williams et al. 2002). Additionally, the evaluation
of the sources of uncertainty during the ARM model
development is useful for prioritizing and focusing
monitoring efforts on only those factors that matter,
which can translate into greater cost efficiency.
Unbalancing The Stool
In an era of shrinking budgets and increasing ex-
penses, managers are often faced with decisions on
how to cut costs. Unfortunately, one common re-
sponse is to eliminate what are believed nonessen-
tial programmatic elements. We argue that man-
agement, research, and monitoring are all crucial for
natural resource conservation and that the loss on
any one of these elements reduces the effectiveness
of the others. The elimination of research often re-
sults in stagnation, where new scientific hypothe-
ses/ ideas do not become part of management. This
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also perpetuates a false separation of “management”
from “science,” thereby reducing the effectiveness of
the former and eliminating the context for the latter.
Similarly, the elimination of monitoring reduces the
effectiveness of management because decision mak-
ers no longer have a basis for judging how system
is performing in relation to management objectives.
Without the feedback provided by monitoring, there
is no ability to assess model predictions with data,
which eliminates the potential for learning about
how systems operate. By contrast, the example of
ARM for the management of North American wa-
terfowl exemplifies how management, research, and
monitoring can be integrated to form effective, sci-
entifically based decision-making.
When active management is eliminated, deci-
sions are then made by default rather than directed
toward an objective. In this context, research and
monitoring programs no longer have explicit value.
Learning may still occur passively if monitoring con-
tinues, but progress would be considerably slower.
However, if monitoring also is eliminated (e.g., if an-
imals are no longer harvested, then tag recoveries
will no longer be available for survival estimation),
learning is prevented.
Summary
Management, research, and monitoring pro-
grams are appropriately viewed as mutually sup-
portive of conservation goals, where the loss of any
1 of the 3 is disruptive to the remaining 2. Man-
agement explicitly includes the goals of the decision
maker and other stakeholders in evaluating the pos-
sible consequences of any potential action. Research
allows us to state the possible consequences of man-
agement actions as predictions, which can be then
be used to compare alternatives and select one that
leads to a decision that appears most likely (taking
into account uncertainty) to achieve our goals. Mon-
itoring provides us with information about the state
of the resource system, so we can judge whether we
are approaching or diverging from our stated goals,
as well as information feedback that allows us to
test the predictions of our decision models, and re-
duce uncertainty through time. This “closed loop”
process, known as ARM, formally integrates man-
agement, research, and monitoring for more effec-
tive natural resource decision-making. ARM pro-
vides a mechanism for dealing with uncertainty -
inevitable in conservation decision-making - while
always keeping resource goals and objectives as
paramount. Under ARM, research and monitor-
ing programs have explicit value in terms of the re-
source objectives are clear, compelling, and critically
needed in natural resource management.
We view all 3 of these legs - management, re-
search, and monitoring - as essential to sound con-
servation. Removal of any 1 of the legs is disrup-
tive to conservation, and ultimately counterproduc-
tive. In particular, action-oriented management is
sometimes pitted against research and monitoring
in the competition for limited funds. This sets up a
false choice, a bit like asking whether children need
food or education in order to become productive
adults. In contrast, under ARM, research and mon-
itoring have explicit value for their contributions to
decision-making. Conversely, we “learn by doing,”
with management actions providing the grist for the
testing of critical assumptions, ultimately reducing
uncertainty and improving decision-making.
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